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No Security In Bankruptcy: The
Argument Against Applying The Federal
Securities Laws To The Trading Of
Claims In Bankruptcy
Anthony Michael Sabino
PREAMBLE
As many of the megamergers and leveraged buyouts of the
Nineteen Eighties sink into the abyss of bankruptcy--Nineteen
Nineties style, a new species of predator has come into being. Be
they called "vulture" investors or funds, "bottom-fishers" or just
plain bargain hunters. These carnivores are more than just in town
with a few days to kill. They hunt for the "turnaround play," that
is, taking control of a bankrupt company for as cheaply as possible,
and resurrecting it into a profitable enterprise.
As the emerging trend of cases have amply demonstrated, their
weapon of choice is trading in claims against the debtor.' One
court recently observed:
[S]ince the recent filings of "megacases'" the trading in claims has
become a brisk business which involves millions of dollars. Numerous
articles and bankruptcy law seminars have addressed the trading of
claims that has come about as a result of these cases. Several
* Anthony M. Sabino is an Associate Attorney with Marks & Murase in New York, New
York. Mr. Sabino is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at St. John's University College of Business
and Administration. Mr. Sabino was formerly Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Joseph Devito,
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. Mr. Sabino received is B.A. (1980)
from St. John's University College of Business Administration and his J.D. (1983) from St. John's
University School of Law.
The author dedicates this article with deepest affection to Michael Anthony Sabino, and to all
his hopes and dreams.
1. The penultimate case in this realm is In re Allegheny International, Inc., 118 B.R. 282
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), while probably the most erudite discussion of the general issue is found
in Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1990).
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bankruptcy judges have also expressed concern over the increased
claims trading.2
Given the similarities of trading in claims for the purpose of
taking control of a debtor to the trading in securities of solvent
companies for the same purpose, the question naturally arises as to
how the former burgeoning market should be regulated, if at all.
On one side, some noted veterans of this new order of battle in the
bankruptcy court have stated that "[tihe securities laws do not,
either on their face or as interpreted by recent decisions, define
trade claims in bankruptcy as "securities.' 3 In contrast, others
have concluded that the federal securities code is readily adaptable
to the claims trading process in the bankruptcy court.4
To be sure, this writer has not shied away, in the past, from
advocating a greater confluence of the Bankruptcy Code5 and the
federal securities laws in matters where business entities subject to
securities regulation are brought into proceedings governed by
bankruptcy law.6 Notwithstanding that history, the author must
nonetheless veer from that course today, for it seems apparent that
a number of reasons exist why federal securities laws7 should not
apply to the trading of claims in bankruptcy. This Article will
explore the reasoning underlying that conclusion, in the hope of
advancing the debate on this critical issue to a just result.
2. In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc., 115 B.R. 97, 100 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (White, 3.).
3. Fortgang & Mayer, supra n. 1, at 47.
4. James D. Prendergast, Applying Federal Securities Law to the Trading of Bankruptcy
Claims, 3 F&G BANKB. L. R V. 9, 17 (Winter 1992).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1992).
6. See Anthony M. Sabino & Sabino, The Role of the SEC in Bankruptcy, 2 F&G
BANKR. L. REv. 5 (Winter 1991); Anthony M. Sabino, The Role of Bankruptcy Courts in
Stockbrokerage Liquidations, 16 SEC. REG. LJ. 227 (1988).
7. The federal securities laws referred to herein are the Securities Act of 1933, codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7Thbb (1992), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codifed at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78m (1992), also known as the 1933 and 1934 Acts, respectively.
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I. THE EXISTING CLAIMS TRADING PRocEss
A. The Controversy Begins
While not dispositive of the precise issue here, In re
Allegheny8 must be examined as the precursor to the present
controversy. In this case, the debtor was the target of an attempted
takeover by Japonica Partners, a limited partnership created by two
former investment bankers.9 "Japonica had been a stranger to
Allegheny - neither a creditor nor a shareholder of the company
... Unable to negotiate a takeover, Japonica decided to pursue the
company in a different way."1 " In short, Japonica went on a spree
of purchasing creditors' claims, in order to both block the debtor's
reorganization plan and ensure the acceptance of Japonica's own
plan for control." Although the insurgent's campaign was stopped
cold by the bankruptcy court," Japonica ultimately settled with all
parties and brought the debtor out of bankruptcy.13
Allegheny has become the most notorious example of the
trading in claims for our times. Indeed, the case rises to the level
of infamy, given Bankruptcy Judge Cosetti's excoriation of the
erstwhile takeover mavens at Japonica. Whatever the outcome,
however, Allegheny is looked to as the catalyst of the present
debate over the desirability of claims trading, including the instant
question of applying the federal securities laws to the trading of
claims in bankruptcy. 4
Moreover, the herald to the landmark Allegheny case was an
earlier decision in that same proceeding, wherein the court strictly
circumscribed the conditions under which creditor claims could be
8. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
9. Id. at 285.
10. John J. Jerome & Richard C. Tufaro, Mergers and Acquisitions in Bankruptcy Court:
The Allegheny Experience, 3 F&G BANKR. L Rav. 12, 13 (Spring, 1991).
11. Id. at 13; see Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 286-87.
12. Allegheny, 118 B.R. at 303.
13. John J. Jerome & Richard C. Tufaro, supra note 10, at 16-17.
14. See generally Prendergrast, supra note 4, at 17; Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 1, at
45-46.
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purchased by a potential acquiror.15 Notably, there were the grave
concerns expressed by the court as to the very propriety of claims
trading.16  Clearly, the Allegheny court forewarned of the
momentous decision yet to come, and, as shall be seen herein,
thereby compelled the subsequent revision of the relevant Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to their present form.
B. The Revised Rule 3001
A significant event which resulted at least in part from the
debate over the trading of claims in bankruptcy was the most
recent revision of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001. t7
Previously, the Rule called upon the bankruptcy judge to play a
major role in supervising the transfer of any claim against the
debtor." Indeed, some courts looked to the then-existing rule as
support for the "heightened scrutiny of transfers of claims." 19
In the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Rules, presented in August of 1989,20 the Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 3001 made it clear as crystal that the
judiciary had decided it was time for bankruptcy judges to depart
from the task of overseeing the trading of claims.
21
15. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., I00 B.R. 241,243-44 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
16. Id. at 243. Judge Cosetti opined:
By the filing of a bankruptcy case, a market in nonpublicly traded securities is created.
Claimants are not protected by a disclosure statement. It is an undesirable practice ....
We do not believe that Congress intended the trafficking in claims such as has occurred
in this case and others .... Although this case does not involve inside knowledge, it is
colored with superior knowledge, and thus the assignments are similar to contracts of
adhesion. We hope that Congress will address these concerns in the future.
Id.
17. See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L No. 93-353, § 354, 98 Stat. 333 (amending FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3001); Prendergast, supra note 4, at 9.
18. See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L No. 93-353, § 354, 98 Stat. 333 (amending FED. R.
BANKn. P. 3001); Prendergast, supra note 4, at 10.
19. See, e.g., In re IRG, Inc., 124 B.R. 653, 656-57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
20. See generally Anthony M. Sabino, New Bankruptcy Rules for the New Decade, 1 F&O
BAN4a. I. REV. 22 (Winter 1990) (discussing the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Rules).
21. Fed. I Bank. P. 3001(e), Advisory Committee's Note, reported at 126 F.R.D. 193-94
(1989). The Note stated:
112
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As could be expected, the text of the present Rule accurately
reflects the intent of the Note,' by making the entire process
quite automatic and mechanical, with court participation allowed
only in exceptional cases.23 As stated by Bankruptcy Judge White
even before the amended Rule 3001 took effect, "the purpose of
the amendment is to lessen the [c]ourt's involvement when claims
are transferred."'
24
In sum, "[t]hese revisions have eliminated any statutory support
for the bankruptcy court's ability to involve itself in the trading of
claims" pursuant to the Rule.25 Beyond question, much of the
Allegheny ruling would not be possible today under the structure of
the new Rule 3001. The amended provision has taken away the
power of the bankruptcy court to inject itself into the claims
trading process, negating the precedent of Allegheny for judicial
control over trading in claims. As in nature, the law abhors a
vacuum, and it is this delimiting of Rule 3001 that has incited the
instant debate.
C. The Aftermath of the New Rule 3001
In some circles, the retreat of the bankruptcy court from this
arena has given rise to fears that the law of the financial jungle
Subdivision (e) [of Rule 30011 is amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of
disputes regarding transfers of claim& If a claim has been transferred prior to the filing
of a proof of claim, there is no need to state the consideration for the transfer or to submit
other evidence of the transfer. If a claim has been transferred other than for security after
a proof of claim has been filed, the transferee is substituted for the transferor in the
absence of a timely objection by the alleged transferor. In that event, the clerk should note
the transfer without the need for court approval. If a timely objection is filed, the court's
role is to determine whether a transfer has been made that is enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law. This rule is not intended either to encourage or discourage
postpeddon transfers of claims or to affect any remedies otherwise available under
nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee such as for misrepresentation in connection
with the transfer of a claim. "'After notice and a hearing" as used in subdivision (e) shall
be construed in accordance with paragraph (5).
Id (emphasis added).
22. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(Ce), reported at 135 F.R.D. 279-82 (1991).
23. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 119 B.R. 440,444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
the amended rule -takes the bankruptcy court out of the administrative loop").
24. In re Odd Lot Trading, Inc., 115 BIL 97, 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
25. Prendergast, supra note 4, at 10.
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will take hold, with sophisticated, yet unscrupulous "sharks"
devouring more diminutive claimholders.26 Left unchecked, they
say, parties who seek to take control of a debtor by buying up
creditors' claims will prey upon weaker stakeholders, who simply
want to see some recovery today and extricate themselves from the
often times painful process of bankruptcy.27
Focusing upon the Committee's statement that the changes to
Rule 3001 are not intended to affect any non-bankruptcy remedies
that a deceived claims seller may have against a misrepresenting
buyer, well-intentioned prophets of doom have cried out for the
insertion of an appropriate regulatory scheme.' To that end, the
federal securities laws, a proven watchdog of another kind, have
been offered as having the greatest adaptability to the problem at
hand.29 While the goal here is laudable, and the federal laws are
inarguably potent tools for enforcement, the viability of this
proposal remains to be tested. The adaptability and effectiveness of
the securities laws will constitute the next phase of this analysis.
I. WHAT Is A SEcuRrrY? THE REVES TEST
Whether making the argument for or against the application of
the federal securities laws to the trading of claims in bankruptcy
cases, commentators have heretofore relied heavily upon the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in deciding what constitutes a
security regulated by the federal statutory scheme.3" Most recent
and powerful in that realm is the high Court's decision in Reves v.
Ernst & Young.31 Following the trail already blazed by others, this
article likewise heads in a similar direction.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. Writing for
the Court, Justice Marshall posited that the question before the
26. For a general commentary on the growth of "vulture investing" in reorganizing
companies, see David G. Heiman & Shawn M. Riley, Are Vulture Investors Changing the Face of
Chapter 11?, 2 F&G BANKR. L Ruv. 5 (Fall 1990).
27. See generally Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 1, at 84; Prendergast, supra note 4, at 17.
28. Prendergast, supra note 4, at 17.
29. Id at 11.
30. Id at 11-12.
31. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
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tribunal was whether certain demand notes issued by a farmers'
cooperative constituted securities within the meaning of section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.32
Of paramount relevancy here were the facts that the alleged
"securities" were promissory notes payable upon demand, paying
a variable rate of interest adjusted monthly, and that the scheme
was marketed as an "investment program. ' 33 Although the co-op
did warn that the notes were not federally insured, the investment
was touted, nevertheless, as safe, secure, and readily available.3'
Unfortunately, the co-op went into bankruptcy, leaving over 1,600
persons holding notes worth a total of $10 million.35  After the
noteholders prevailed at trial,36  the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the defendants that the
demand notes were not securities, and therefore, the federal
securities statutes did not apply.37
The Supreme Court reversed, and found for the noteholders. 38
In setting forth its reasoning, 39 the high Court first acknowledged
that "Congress painted with a broad brush" in creating the
32. Id. at 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(10) (1992). The statute reads as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument
commonly known as a "security;" or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity
of which is like-wise limited.
Id.
33. Reves, 494 U.S. at 58-59.
34. Id. at 59.
35. Id. at 58-59.
36. Id at 59.
37. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 55 (1988).
38. Reves, 494 U.S. at 60.
39. It should be noted that although the Court divided elsewhere, the Justices were unanimous
in the rationale. Id. at 58.
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securities acts, "recogniz[ing] the virtually limitless scope of
human ingenuity, especially in the creation of 'countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits."'" Per force, the
Congressional vision of a security is "sufficiently broad to
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an
investment.'41
Yet it is also true, continued Justice Marshall, that the
lawmakers did not intend to provide a pervasive federal remedy for
all fraud.42 Ultimately, it is for the courts to define a security
within the ambit of the securities code,4 3 a task in which the
judges must "take account of the economies of the transaction
under investigation," and not its mere formalities." G o i n g
forward, the high Court contrasted stock, which it viewed as the
quintessence of a security, with a note, which can be used "in
a variety of settings, not all of which involve investments." 46
Rejecting the applicability of the "investment contract" test it
devised in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.47 to the instant "note"
controversy, 48 the Justices adopted the "family resemblance" test
pioneered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.,4 9 adding
the new presumption "that every note is a security." 50
Importantly, the Supreme Court agreed with the list of items
identified by the appellate tribunal in Exchange National Bank as
40. Id. at 60-61 (quoting SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
41. Id. at 61. See United Hous. Found, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975)
(discussing the congressional interpretation of what constitutes a security).
42. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)).
43. Id. The Court added that it has consistently held that the definition of a security is the
same under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 61 n.1; see S. Rep. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1934) (stating that the Senate Report on the 1934 Act stated that the definition of a security therein
was "substantially the same" as the 1933 Act's definition).
44. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
45. Id. at 62 (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985)).
46. Id.
47. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
48. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64.
49. 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65 (footnote omitted).
116
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not being securities, including notes delivered in consumer
financing, notes secured by a mortgage on a home, short-term notes
secured by a lien on a small business or some or all of its assets,
notes evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term
notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, notes which
simply formalize an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary
course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of
a broker, it is collateralized), and notes evidencing loans by
commercial banks to borrowers for sustaining operations.5
Finding a need for more guidance, however, Justice Marshall
elaborated by setting forth the standards of the new "note as a
security" test.
52
Thus, the Supreme Court promulgated the modem test for
determining whether a note is a security actionable under the
federal securities laws. Commencing with the presumption that a
"note" is a security, that presumption is only to be rebutted by a
demonstration that the instrument bears a strong "family
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 66-67. Justice Marshall opined:
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would prompt a reasonable
seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general
use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is
interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely
to be a 'security.- If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor
asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance
some other commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly
described as a "security."
Ma at 66. For the second and third prongs, the Court instructed:
[We examine the "plan of distribution" of the instrument, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943), to determine whether it is an instrument in which there
is "common trading for speculation or investment," id., at 351. Third, we examine the
reasonable expectations of the investing public: The Court will consider instruments to be
"'securities" on the basis of such public expectations, even where an economic analysis
of the circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are
not "securities" as used in that transaction.
Ict Finally, the last point for scrutiny under this new test would be:
[W]hether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly
reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts
unnecessary.
Id. at 67.
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resemblance" to one of the foregoing exceptions or represents a
new category worthy of exemption under the same test.53
Applying the foundling test to the controversy at hand, the high
Court had "little difficulty" in concluding the co-op's notes were
in fact securities. 54 Examining the co-op's distribution scheme for
the notes, the Court pointed out that they were offered and sold to
a "broad segment of the public," thus establishing the "common
trading" facet referred to in earlier holdings.55 Next, "the public's
reasonable perceptions - also supports a finding that the notes in
this case [were] 'securities,"' given that the co-op explicitly
characterized them as investments.56 Lastly, the Court found that
the notes did not possess a "risk-reducing factor," by way of
another applicable regulatory scheme, to suggest they were, in fact,
not seCunties.57
The Justices furthermore rejected the argument that, because the
notes were payable upon demand, they therefore could not be
securities.58  Noting that common stock, "the paradigm of a
security," is readily convertible to cash, the Court went on to find
that the same is true of "publicly traded corporate bonds,
53. Id.
54. Id. Justice Marshall wrote:
The Co-Op sold the notes in an effort to raise capital for its general business operations,
and purchasers bought them in order to earn a profit in the form of interest.. .Mhen, the
transaction is most naturally conceived as an investment in a business enterprise rather
than as a purely commercial or consumer transaction.
l at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 68. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985) (discussing the
"common trading" aspect of the definition of a security).
56. Reves, 494 U.S. at 68-69.
57. kla at 69. Justice Marshall compared and stated:
[U]nlike the certificates of deposit in Marine Bank, supra, at 557-558, which were insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial regulation under
the federal banking laws, and unlike the pension plan in Teamsters v. Daniel 439 U.S.
551, 569-570 (1979), which was comprehensively regulated under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1982
ed.), the notes here would escape federal regulation entirely if the [securities] Acts were
held not to apply.
ICE
58. Id
118
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debentures, and any number of other instruments," all of which fall
within the clear provisions of the federal securities code.59
In view of all the above, the Supreme Court held that the notes
at issue in Reves were securities within the term "note," as found
in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and, therefore, subject to the
federal securities laws.' Reves presents the most recent wisdom
of the Supreme Court on the question of what constitutes a security
subject to federal regulation. Thus, the decision will play a key role
here, for to employ the federal securities laws to regulate the
trading in claims means we must determine if a bankruptcy claim
is a security under Reves.
Im. DISCUSSION
As previously explained, the Reves formulation of what
qualifies as a security constitutes the most critical phase of our
analysis. To be sure, however, to answer the question of whether
claims trading in bankruptcy should be subject to the federal
securities laws demands a comprehensive review of other important
aspects of the issue as well. Sensibly, we should therefore
commence by examining the letter of the law itself.
A. Statutory Analysis
Key to this calculus is the overall perception of the bankruptcy
claim that is to be traded. Is it simply a creditor's claim for
payment or is it more like a security? At least one commentator
theorizes that the filing of the bankruptcy petition transmutes even
the ordinary trade claim into a security, because the claimant now
has the right to a "dividend," that is, in bankruptcy parlance, a
right to participate with other creditors in any payout from the
debtor's estate.61
59. Id.
60. IdM at 69-70.
61. See Prendergast, supra note 4, at 12.
119
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However, it is submitted here that such a facile analysis of the
so-called bankruptcy "dividend" is flawed when compared to the
statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. First, it does not
account for a claimant in bankruptcy that is a member of an
unimpaired class. A creditor fortunate enough to have its claim left
unaltered by the proceeding, in short one receiving full value, is
deemed unimpaired.62 In this writer's view, it is beyond cavil that
such a claim is constant throughout the bankruptcy process, and
thus could never be transformed into a security.
Moreover, if the creditor body is comprised of impaired
claimants as well as claims that survive unimpaired, as is often the
case, is it not inequitable, if not irrational, to further segregate
those stakeholders into unimpaired straight claimants and impaired
"security" holders? Added to this tempestuous brew is the
frequent occurrence of differing degrees of impairment amongst the
creditor classes in anything other than the most simple of
bankruptcy reorganizations. While not an overriding concern, one
can appreciate the potential for an Orwellian absurdity here, as
claimants devolve into a "some claims are more like securities
than others" scenario.
The second flaw in this claim-as-security theorem is that a
claim against the debtor is far different from the typical
commercial transaction originally underlying the pre-bankruptcy
debtor-creditor relationship. At the outset, the Bankruptcy Code
defines a "claim" as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured. 63
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1992).
63. Id. § 101(5) (1992).
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Indeed, the corollary to the foregoing is the Code's definition, in
relevant part, of a creditor as an entity with "a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before" the bankruptcy
commenced."
Neither the letter nor the spirit of the foregoing unambiguous
definitions lend support to the hypothesis that a claim can be
metamorphosized into a security on the event of a bankruptcy
filing. Indeed, the recent demands of the Supreme Court that the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code be given their plain meaning
militates strongly against what could only be characterized as this
tortured extension of those basic definitions. Specifically, Justice
Marshall subsequently opined that the scope of the definition of a
bankruptcy claim "is a straightforward issue of statutory
construction to be resolved by reference to 'the text, history, and
purpose' of the Bankruptcy Code."'  In sum, a claim stays a
claim.67 If so, it never becomes a security, and any application of
the federal securities laws would be in error.
To be sure, it has been argued that the buyer of a claim is
usually a "financial acquiror seeking to obtain a position in the
case, or perhaps a strategic buyer wanting to control the plan
process, all of which are investment motivations and not the
promotion of a commercial purpose. ' 68 No doubt this is true, but
it ignores the relevancy of the claim seller under the same test.
The transferee of a claim is a straightforward creditor of the
debtor. Almost invariably, it sells out because it no longer wishes
to wait to satisfy its claim via the bankruptcy process. The claimant
presumably makes a commercial business decision to convert its
claim into cash, as offered by the claims buyer. The claimant does
this because it certainly does not want to "invest" in the debtor--it
64. Id § 101(10)(A) (1992).
65. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc, 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (discussing
pressures to interpret Bankruptcy Code provisions in the context of their plain meaning),foUowed
by Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S.Ct. 1146,60 U.S. L.W. 4222 (March 9, 1992).
66. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153 (1991) (quoting Farrey v. Sanderfoot,
111 S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991)).
67. Cf. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990)
(Congress intended to adopt the broadest possible definition of "claim").
68. Prendergast, supra note 4, at 13.
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wants to walk away under the best possible circumstances. If so,
why then would the mere fact of the transfer convert the claim into
a security, merely because of the differing motivations of the
parties? While the claims trader is no doubt bent on takeover, is
that enough to surmount the obvious lack of the same investment
and/or control purpose on the part of the claims seller?
This writer thinks not, and concludes that such an interpretation
flies in the face of the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
As such, the letter of the law itself does not support the application
of the federal securities laws to the trading of claims in bankruptcy;
if anything, it stands against that proposal.
B. Under the New Rule 3001
Previously we noted the impact of the revisions to Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001.6' What is generally overlooked,
but is, nevertheless, quite implicit in this seemingly innocent rule
change is that the bankruptcy court is clearly taken out of the game
of overseeing the transfer of claims. This must give one pause, for
if the judicial rulemaking bodies were so intent on excluding any
hint of such supervisory powers from the very rules that guide the
bankruptcy courts' daily functioning, is it not sheer folly to think
that another regulatory scheme, such as the federal securities code,
should quickly be installed in its place?
All concerned agree that the prior attempts of bankruptcy
judges to involve themselves in regulating claims trading, such as
in Allegheny, have been effectively prohibited by the revisions to
Rule 3001.70 The natural conclusion one is left to is that if the
bankruptcy courts cannot intervene in the trading of claims
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, why should
they suddenly retake that now-forbidden power, by borrowing the
basically unrelated provisions of the federal securities laws? The
122
69. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (discussing the revisions to Rule 3001 and
the implications thereof).
70. Prendergast, supra note 4, at 9-11; Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 1, at 42-43. See FED.
R. BALR. P. 3001.
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obvious answer, of course, is that such a situation cannot be
permitted. And so, the changes to Rule 3001 also argue against the
application of the federal securities laws to trading in bankruptcy
claims.
C. The Reves Standard
As indicated above, the decision of the Supreme Court in Reves
v. Ernst & Young71 is paramount to this discussion of the claim
as a security. In this writer's view, the inability of a creditor's
claim against a debtor to be deemed a security pursuant to the
Reves formulation would foreclose any possibility of applying the
federal securities laws to the trading of bankruptcy claims. To be
sure, a failure to qualify under Reves is exactly the result obtained
in the following analysis.
1. Factual Distinctions
Consider first the factual predicates for the Court's landmark
ruling, as set forth by Justice Marshall. Importantly, the opinion
emphasized that the notes were explicitly sold to a broad range of
the public as an investment program.' Safety, security, and
liquidity were the tag lines for the co-op's promotion.73
Are such characteristics typical of claims trading in bankruptcy
cases? This author thinks not.
Claims in bankruptcy may be an investment for the acquiror,
but the term does not apply full force to a creditor seeking to cut
its losses, let alone recoup its receivable from the debtor. Next, it
is the claims purchaser that approaches the finite group of
claimholders, and even then, the acquiror may be quite selective in
what claims it seeks to purchase.
Moreover, it is the rare case indeed for claimants to openly
peddle their rights to payment from the bankrupt. Such offers to
71. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
72. Id at 59.
73. Id.
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sell are almost invariably triggered by the presence of an entity
bent on taking over the debtor. And, as is true of the limited
universe of sellers, the buyers constitute an even more select group,
making both sides quite unlike the general public targeted in Reves.
Finally, what is safe, secure, and liquid about claims against
debtors, at least for the original holders? Fraught with risk, with
recovery speculative as to both time and amount, and availability
of payment absolutely forbidden until a plan is confirmed,74 at a
minimum from a stakeholder's perspective, a claim in bankruptcy
is nothing like a security, even a high-risk one. Again, the factual
dissimilarities are overpowering and almost dispositive of the
question by themselves.
2. The General Legal Standard
Turning to the law of Reves, the ruling begins by explaining the
underlying philosophy of federal securities regulation--to police the
capital markets.75 While the trading of claims in bankruptcy
connotes, at bottom, a "market" of sorts, it is vastly different from
the true equity and debt instrument markets of today. Even
allowing for the dynamicism of the financial world, claims trading
is a commercial venture and not a true securities exchange,
notwithstanding that control of the debtor may be the ultimate goal
of the acquiror.
This fundamental distinction is shown abundantly in Reves,
with the observation that when it enacted the securities laws,
Congress nevertheless did not intend to provide an all
encompassing federal remedy for all fraud.76 By these words, the
Supreme Court made it crystal clear that even this new test in
Reves has limits.
Such a caveat by the high Court cuts against interpreting Reves
in support of classifying a bankruptcy claim as a security. Again,
and in the same breath, Justice Marshall tells us the purpose of the
74. See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'IInc., 118 B.R 282, 296 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
75. Reves, 494 U.S. at 60-61.
76. Id at 61.
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federal securities laws is to regulate investments,' something the
previous discussion herein has argued a bankruptcy claim is most
certainly not.
Continuing in this vein, Reves is careful to point out that not
every "note" is a security, as the demand notes in that case were
ultimately found to be.78 This holding debunks the notion that
since a claim may be like a note payable (a suspect characterization
in itself), it is therefore a security.79 Reves tells us that while
notes do come in all shapes and sizes, and for all sorts of purposes,
they are not all securities, even under the new standard."0
In adopting the "family resemblance" test to determine if a
note is a security, the high Court specifically enumerated a variety
of notes that it ruled were not securities, several of which are
identical to or closely mimic the transactions underlying a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy." These include mortgage notes,
notes financing a business and secured by a lien on the borrower's
assets, notes secured by pledged accounts receivable, and simple
commercial finance transactions.8 2
Logic dictates here that if Reves excludes such notes from the
realm of securities, bankruptcy claims created in the same or a
similar fashion must likewise be denied status as securities. It then
follows that the application of the federal securities laws to such
claims is not at all proper under the Reves standard.
D. The Reves Four-Point Test
The case against the claim as a security becomes even more
convincing as we apply the Supreme Court's further test for
determining if a note is a security. The Reves factors are commonly
77. Id
78. Id. at 62.
79. Cf. In re Standard Oil & Exploration of Delaware, Inc, 136 B.R. 141, 153 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1992) (holding that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(0, notes issued by a Chapter 11 debtor post-
petition to raise fresh capital are exempt from the registration requirements of the federal securities
laws).
80. Reves, 494 U.S. at 62.
81. Id. at 65.
82. Id.
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used by federal courts, and this analysis will discuss the Reves test
as recently applied in Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific
National Bank. 3 First, the motivational test asks if the "seller's
purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business
enterprise or to finance substantial investments."" Here, there is
a not so subtle distinction between a true security thereunder and
a creditor's claim against a debtor.
While the seller's purpose in trading its claim is undoubtedly
to raise money, it does so to create cash for its, the creditor's,
business. It does not trade its claim to raise money for the debtor's
business, which is what this prong of the Reves test demands.
Additionally, the creditor sells not to invest in the debtor, but to
extricate itself from the debtor's insolvency. Note that even though
the buyer of the claim may satisfy the profit motivation Reves
requires, the test is conjunctive, with a notable emphasis on the
seller, and, per force, the failure on this threshold aspect should
end the inquiry.85 Nevertheless, let us proceed with the remaining
points of the test.
Second is the "common trading" requirement.86 While the
Court's perfunctory mention of this facet is open to interpretation,
for reasons elaborated upon above, claims trading in bankruptcy
would seem to still fall far short of the commonality requirement,
given the relative bounds of its use.87 Even the staunchest
advocate of applying the securities code to claims trading would
find itself on a slippery slope when arguing that this common
trading prerequisite is met when trading bankruptcy claims. Such
83. 763 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
84. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
85. Accord Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36,42-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that loan participation is not a security under the Reves motivational prong
because the creditor/seller's goal was to reduce the risk of non-payment by the debtor, in other words
simply "the promotion of commercial purposes and not investments"). This Case was recently
affirmed by the Second Circuit on June 24, 1992. See Banco Espanol De Credito v. Security Pacific
Nat'l Bank, 61 U.S.L.W. 2027 (July 14, 1992).
86. See Banco Espano!, 763 F. Supp. at 43.
87. See id. The court found that the purchasers of loan participations were "sophisticated
financial and commercial institutions," not unlike the 'vulture" investors who buy bankruptcy
claims. Idr
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trading is, by any measure, far more uncommon than the pervasive
trading in true securities.
Third, there is the matter of the reasonable expectations of the
investing public.88 One must first ask if trading in claims is truly
public? That concept has been refuted at length hereinbefore. Even
today, the universe of claims sellers and buyers is a far cry from
being considered a truly public market. As to the other half of this
point, the broad public of investors would, in any event, probably
not hold the same reasonable expectations when trading claims as
when transacting in the more traditional investments presently
subject to the federal securities laws. 9 Again, the bankruptcy
claim fails to measure up as a security.
The last factor of Reves is whether the existence of some other
regulatory scheme preempts the federal securities code, by
regulating the purported "investment." '  Nothing could be more
true than the fact that the trading of claims in bankruptcy cases is
already subject to a highly regulated scheme that clearly preempts
application of the federal securities laws. That body of law is, of
course, the Bankruptcy Code.9 An elaboration of this point is
found below.
In sum, the new edict of the Supreme Court demands that any
instrument alleged to constitute a security be tested against the
four-pronged test of Reves. When a claim in bankruptcy is so
evaluated, it cannot pass muster on any of those several points.
Thus, if the result of applying the high Court's standard to a claim
is its failure to qualify as a security, Reves must be taken as
opposing the employment of the federal securities laws to the
trading of claims in bankruptcy.
88. Id
89. Id. The court opined that there was "no indication that the general public was even aware
of the existence" of the loan participations. Id
90. Id
91. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1992).
92. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing the standards articulated by the
court in Reves).
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E. The Bankruptcy Code - The Existing Regulatory Scheme
As we have seen, advocates for the extension of the federal
securities laws to the trading of claims in bankruptcy generally
argue under the rubric that such an application will insure full and
adequate disclosure of all matters pertinent to the valuation of a
claim, prevent the misuse of "insider" 93 information, and shall
assure the presence of a level playing field.9' However, the
borrowing of the federal securities code to achieve those aims
would be redundant here, since the laws of bankruptcy already go
far in attaining those worthwhile goals.
In its general provisions, the Bankruptcy Code has long
required a meeting of creditors,95 and an examination of the
debtor there at,96 ostensibly to assure that all creditors have an
opportunity to be as fully informed about the debtor's affairs as
93. The Bankruptcy Code definition of an "insider" is:
(A) if the debtor is an individual-
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor,
(i) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(iii) general partner of the debtor, or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor,
(ii) officer of the debtor,
(iii) person in control of the debtor,
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(v) general partner of the debtor, or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor,
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-
(i) general partner in the debtor,
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in control of the debtor,
(ill) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(iv) general partner of the debtor, or
(v) person in control of the debtor,
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative of an elected
official of the debtor,
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor, and
(F) managing agent of the debtor,
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1992).
94. Prendergast, supra note 4, at 17.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1992).
96. Id § 343 (1992).
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possible.' The debtor is dutybound to file with the bankruptcy
court schedules listing its creditors, assets and liabilities, income
and expenditures, and a statement of its financial affairs, the latter
being rather intricate in its required detail. 98 Failure by the debtor
to adequately comply with this structure is grounds for dismissal
of its bankruptcy case." The Code thereby maximizes full and
adequate disclosures by the debtor as a matter of public record, a
functional equivalent of the disclosure mandated under the
securities laws.
The specific requirements of Chapter 11 proceedings are even
more arduous for the reorganizing debtor. There, multiple
committees of creditors watching over the debtor are the norm,1"
and these committees wield significant power. Specifically, the
committees may employ professionals, subject to court
approval,101 to assist in their statutory tasks of investigating the
debtor's financial condition and operations, participating in the
formulation of a plan of reorganization, and such other services that
are in the interests of the creditors on that committee."° Added
scrutiny emanates from the involvement of the United States
Trustee, a quasi-judicial official whose statutory duty is to
"supervise the administration" of all bankruptcy cases, regardless
of the particular chapter under which they are filed."03
It is in the disclosure and solicitation of approval for a plan of
reorganization that the debtor truly has its work cut out. First, the
disclosure statement must be disseminated.104 As stated, essential
97. See Carlson v. Boucher (In re Boucher), 728 F.2d 1152,1155 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining
the scope of a section 343 examination). Cf. In re Gold Strike, Inc., 122 B.R. 803, 804 (Bankr. S.D.
Fl. 1990) (upholding the dismissal of a bankruptcy case for reason of debtor's unexcused failure to
attend the first meeting of creditors).
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1992).
99. See In re Clark, 76 B.R. 218,219 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal,
Inc., 65 B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1992).
101. Id § 1103(a) (1992).
102. Id § 1103(c) (1992).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 586(aX3) (1992).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1992). The statute provides:
An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be solicited after the commencement of the
case under this title from a holder of a claim or interest with respect to such claim or
interest, unless, at the time of or before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such
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here is that the disclosure document contain statutorily "adequate
information."" Admittedly, devices such as the disclosure
statement and the plan of reorganization may very well not come
into being until after there has been some trading in claims. While
this may undermine the efficacy of these procedures to some
degree, the more thoughtful of claimants will undoubtly refuse to
act hastily until they have had the benefit of adequate information
via these or other avenues.
In the same stroke as demanding such prodigious disclosure by
any erstwhile plan proponent, the Code likewise makes it plain that
it retains exclusive jurisdiction. The same statute explicitly states
that the adequacy of information as required above "is not
governed by any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law." ' 0 6
Notably, any plan proponent is not liable on account of its
participation in promoting the plan for violation of the securities
laws.1 7 The paramountcy of the Bankruptcy Code in these
matters was recently exemplified in the case of In re Applegate
Property, Ltd.108 Notably, Applegate has even greater significance
here because it is also a post-Allegheny, post-Rule 3001 amendment
decision.
Applegate arose from a dispute between the debtor and the
Resolution Trust Corporation over a vote for competing plans of
holder the plan or a summary of the court as containing adequate information. The court
may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an appraisal of
the debtor's assets.
Id (emphasis added).
105. Id § 1125(a)(1) (1992). Adequate information is defined:
[lInformation of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light
of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and
records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims
or interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but
adequate information need not include such information about any other possible or
proposed plan.
Id
106. Id. § 1125(d) (1992). Notably, while an agency or official whose duty it is to administer
or enforce such non-code law may be heard from on this issue, that party cannot appeal from or seek
review of the bankruptcy courts decision if the court deems the disclosure statement to be in
conformity with the law. Id.
107. Id. § 1125(e)(1992);see id. § 1145 (1992) (providing "exemption from securities laws").
108. 133 B.R. 827 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
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reorganization.'0 9 Interestingly, it seems that a related entity of
the debtor "was covertly purchasing claims in order to gain an
advantage in the [plan] voting process." ' Among other things,
the RTC complained that said claims acquisitions should have been
revealed in the disclosure statement propounded by the debtor in
support of its plan to reorganize."'
Bankruptcy Judge Leif Clark first addressed whether the
disclosure statement met the statutory requirement for adequate
information. Such a decision, opined the tribunal, "is left largely
to the discretion of the bankruptcy court." '
Moreover, the Applegate court held that disclosure statements
were not required to meet the rigorous standards of their securities
counterparts.' To be sure, the judge added that the Bankruptcy
Code does not prohibit seeking guidance from the federal securities
laws as to what constitutes appropriate disclosure in any given
situation.1 14 Nevertheless, Judge Clark clearly placed his reliance
upon the supremacy of the relevant bankruptcy law in these
matters. Citing primarily to section 1125, the court found the
debtor's disclosure statement deficient under that statute because it
did not contain adequate information about the claims
purchases." 5 While the court surprised no one in condemning the
flagrantly improper acts of the debtor in the case at hand,
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id.
111. M
112. Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
113. Id at 829-30. The court stated-
[A] disclosure statement need not meet the extensive disclosure requirements of the securities
laws for registration statements and the like. Indeed, Section 1125(d) provides that the adequacy
of a disclosure statement is not governed by any otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law, rule
or regulation.
Id.
114. Id. at 830.
115. lt at 831. Indeed, this debtor was twice doomed, because the court went onto find that
the purchasing of claims by the debtor's affiliate for the purpose of blocking the RTC's competing
plan was an "'obstructionist tactic" that could not be condoned. Id. at 835.
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parenthetically it was made clear that claims trading in other
proceedings need not carry the same stigma.116
Not unlike certain other decisions in this area, the Applegate
holding is probably more significant for what it does not decide.
This recent case, having the benefit of the earlier debate, and itself
firmly ensconced within the new Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 3001, neatly states the priority and comprehensiveness
of the Bankruptcy Code in matters of ensuring full disclosure to
claimants, without resort to the securities acts.11 7 The court
intervened here not to prohibit claims trading as a general
proposition, but to rectify a specific wrong in an individual case.
Certainly, Applegate cannot be construed as favorable to applying
the federal securities laws to the trading of claims in bankruptcy.
In sum, not only does the existence of the Bankruptcy Code as
the pre-empting regulatory scheme mean that there is a failure to
qualify a claim as a security under the fourth prong of the Reves
test,118 the pragmatic result is that it demonstrates the federal
securities code is not needed to regulate trading in claims. The
Bankruptcy Code already governs claims trading, by policing the
bankruptcy process, ensuring that accurate and "adequate"
information flows to creditors, and that equitable treatment for all
parties is achieved.
F. The Howey Test
In addition to the Reves scenario above, it should be noted that
the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co. "9 can be dismissed as inapplicable in the context of
determining whether to apply the federal securities code to trading
116. Id. at 836. Judge Clark stated in an important aside that:
This is not to say, however, that there are never legitimate grounds for buying claims.
Under the proper circumstances, the purchasing of claims may well be a legitimate tactic.
What those legitimate grounds are is not presently before the court nor is the court
inclined to embark on such a discussion.
Id at 836 n.7.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the fourth prong of the Reves test).
119. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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in bankruptcy claims.' 20 As point in fact, by the Court's own
words, the Howey test was created to avoid "unrealistic and
irrelevant formulae" in characterizing a transaction as a security
cognizable under the federal securities code.12 1
Notwithstanding the broad sweep of Howey, it is clearly
inapplicable to the claims trading genre, simply because it
envisions profits to be made from the efforts of others. Certainly,
those trading in claims do so to control or to at least influence the
management of the bankruptcy enterprise. The direct "hands-on"
stance of claims purchasers quickly eliminates them from the
Howey formulation. Needless to add, the claims seller divests itself
of the debtor when selling its claim, thereby failing to rely upon
the efforts of others to make a profit, likewise failing under the
Howey rule.
In addition, Howey demands that an investment be made. 2
Certainly, even a creditor arguably "invests" in the debtor,
because he expects to be paid, and the payment presumably
includes the creditor's profit margin. This principle is as true for
basic trade suppliers as it is for major bank lenders. Nevertheless,
one must question the validity of equating creditors of such diverse
stripes with true investors. Admittedly, this argument is but a small
supplement to the foregoing refutation of Howey, but it does merit
consideration.
In sum, since a claim in bankruptcy is not a security under this
formulation, the Howey test does not advance one iota the
argument in favor of applying the federal securities laws to trading
in bankruptcy claims.
120. See id. at 298-99. That longstanding regimen holds that-
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial
whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
ICE
121. Id. at 301.
122. Id. at 298-99
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G. Other Factors
Finally, any remaining points do not support the regulation of
claims trading by the imposition of the federal securities code.
Putting aside Allegheny,l"- courts have historically taken an
active role in reviewing the transfer of claims only in limited
circumstances. Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the
predecessor to the modern Bankruptcy Code, courts intervened in
claims trading only to ensure that parties with inside information
could not take advantage and purchase claims they knew to be
worth significantly more than the price they offered the selling
creditor.124
Similarly, in more recent times, courts have imposed
restrictions on non-insider purchasers who possessed greater
information than was available to general creditors 2 5 In In Re
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.,12 6 Bankruptcy Judge Abram's
concern "that the assignor-creditors have not been plainly advised
of their options" clearly arose from the fact that the investment
firm buying the claims for cash made its solicitation just before an
article appeared in the Wall Street Journal "outlining the details of
a plan of reorganization" to be proposed by the debtor at some
uncertain future date.127 Obviously, Revere is highly fact-specific,
and has little utility in answering the instant controversy, except for
one oblique reference by the court therein.
In a footnote, the bankruptcy court cautioned the reader what
this case was not deciding."8 The court chose not to address key
123. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of the court in
Allegheny).
124. See, e.g., American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 144
(1940).
125. See, e.g., In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
126. 58 B.R. I (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 3 n.2. Judge Abram stated:
Nothing in this opinion should be construed to hold that a disclosure statement as
contemplated by Code § 1125 is required before Phoenix may buy claims. Nor is anything
herein to be construed as condoning Phoenix's solicitation to the extent that it may violate
any statutory or regulatory provision. Rather, the court is concerned here simply with
ensuring that overreaching, if indeed it has occurred, is not condoned in performing the
134
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issues, such as the timing of the claims buyer's offer or its
propriety under law, implicitly non-bankruptcy as well as under the
Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, the court did not go so far as to criticize
the concept of trading in claims, interjecting itself therein only to
prevent overreaching by sophisticated buyers in that process.'29
On a different note, the court policed claims trading in the
contentious Eastern Airlines bankruptcy purely for administrative
reasons.13" In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,' Chief Bankruptcy
Judge Lifland exerted a strong hand over such matters.132 The
senior jurist declared it was well within the bankruptcy court's
inherent power to regulate the trading of claims "where taking
such action is in furtherance of the court's exclusive jurisdiction
over the administration of the debtor's estate and will relieve the
debtor and its estate from a great administrative burden."1
33
Notably, Judge Lifland had even issued an individual rule of his
court to assist in overseeing the claims trading process.134 Critical
here is that the Ionosphere court relied exclusively on the
Bankruptcy Code, and most certainly not the federal securities
laws, in this regulatory endeavor.13
5
somewhat ministerial task of approving an assignment. Other issues, if they exist, are left
for another day.
Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally Carol M. Cropper & Rifka Rosenwein, Disrobing Debtor's Paradise,
MANHATrAN LAW., July-Aug. 1990, at 33, 34 (discussing the Eastern Bankruptcy and Judge
Lifland's involvement in the case).
131. 119 B.R. 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
132. Id. at 444. The judge recited his raison d'etre as follows:
[O]ne of the "evils'" spawned by bankruptcy claims trading in 'mega- cases, the size
of Eastern, is the substantially increased burden associated with monitoring, administrating
and objecting to claims which have been filed against the estate. This increased
administrative burden diverts the limited resources of the Debtor's estate and has the
potential for impeding the reorganization process. Moreover, the Assignment, and other
transactions similar in kind, has the effect of uncontrollably multiplying claims which, in
turn, significantly increases the administrative burden imposed on these estate associated
with claims administration.
Id.
133. Id. at 445.
134. Id. at 443.
135. Id. at 441-47.
135
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In sum, the foregoing cases addressed the matter of claims
trading while it was still in its embryonic stage. Both on the facts
and the law, the continued vitality of said holdings is not certain.
Even so, none of these instances, individually or in the aggregate,
go so far as to justify the engrafting of the federal securities laws
onto the Bankruptcy Code.
To be sure, a decision not to apply the federal securities code
to the trading of claims in bankruptcy does not necessarily mean
the absolute exclusion of those laws from the bankruptcy
arena.13 While the Securities and Exchange Commission is still
reviewing its policies as to its proper role in bankruptcy
proceedings, 37 it is undisputed that the Commission has a right
to be heard from in reorganization cases.13
Although the regulators are there to first ensure the integrity of
the stock markets, by policing trading in a debtor's true public
securities, logic tells us this must positively affect the trading of
claims. By its customary efforts to, inter alia, detect and punish
fraud and trading on inside information, compel disclosure, and
basically maintain a level playing field, the agency promotes the
flow of reliable information to all involved in the case, while
preventing the misuse of the same. While admittedly tangential to
the matter of claims trading, these protections still inure to the
benefit of any claimant who seeks to be as informed as possible
when contemplating an offer to sell its claim.
In addition, the seller of a claim may be quite content not to
have the federal securities code be the law of that nascent market.
One reason for that is the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of
a strict, and remarkably short, uniform statute of limitations for
136. By way of comparison, a legitimate existing intersection between the Bankruptcy Code
and the federal securities laws occurs when the debtor issues securities. See generally Richard L
Morgan, Application of the Securiies Laws in Chapter 11 Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 1983 Iu. L Rsv. 861 (1983).
137. See generally Sabino & Sabino, The Role of tha SEC, supra note 6.
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1992) (enumerating that the SEC "may raise and may appear
and be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 case).
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securities fraud actions. 139 In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson,'40 the high Court decreed that actions
pursuant to the anti-fraud sections of the federal securities laws
must be commenced no more than one year from the date of
discovery and no more than three years from the date of the
occurrence of the alleged fraud.14'
While Lampf thankfully eradicated a confusing crazy-quilt
pattern of differing limitary periods borrowed from individual state
laws, it also cut off more generous statutes of repose found in
various jurisdictions. For a disgruntled claims seller residing in
such a forum, obviously that party would prefer to pursue local
law, and not come under the foreshortened federal limitary rule.
Thus, given the potential for superior remedies outside the federal
securities code, another argument can be made not to apply that
securities law to claims trading in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
The matter of trading claims in bankruptcy is a crucial issue for
an already overwhelmed bankruptcy system. Even as the
recessionary pressures of this decade ease, as inevitably they must,
in good times, as well as bad, bankruptcy will be a constant for the
business community. How parties shall interact as buyers and
sellers of claims against bankrupt entities will, therefore, remain
important.
As this marketplace for claims now develops past its infancy,
the question arises of how to regulate it, if at all. At least one
school of thought proposes that the federal securities laws be
carried over as the most appropriate regulatory scheme to achieve
this enforcement function. 142 Given that the securities code is
well known and established, its proponents contend that it is a
139. Primarily, fraud in the sale or purchase of a security is punished under section 10 of the
1934 Act and the well-known Rule 10b-5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1992); 17a C..R. § 240-10b-5
(1992) (providing general anti-fraud regulation).
140. 111 S.Ct. 2773 (1991).
141. Id. at 2782.
142. See Prendergast, supra note 4, at 17.
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natural candidate for an easy transition to policing bankruptcy
claims as if they were securities. To be sure, this proposal is not
wholly without merit.
However, in view of the foregoing analysis, this Article
concludes that the federal securities laws cannot be transplanted to
watch over the trading of claims in bankruptcy. In the first
instance, past attempts by the courts to intercede in the claims
trading process have been thwarted by changes to the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure.' 43 If the amended Rules do not
accommodate judicial intervention under the Bankruptcy Code's
own procedural guidelines, why should the federal securities laws
be looked to in their place?
Next, the Bankruptcy Code itself does not support such an
interface between the laws of insolvency and the securities code.
The Supreme Court demands the terms of the Bankruptcy Code be
given their "plain meaning."'" To read the statutes therein in
such a way as to call bankruptcy claims "securities" is to do
violence to the letter of the law. That simply cannot be condoned,
thus reinforcing the notion that securities laws have no place in
bankruptcy.
Above all, the Supreme Court in Reves recently pronounced its
view of what is a security for purposes of applying the federal
securities laws. 45 Since the high Court's decrees must be obeyed,
a claim is not a security, and perforce the securities code cannot
apply, unless a claim can qualify under Reves.
As elaborated upon at length hereinabove, a claim traded in
bankruptcy fails the Reves test.146 Likewise, a bankruptcy claim
fares no better under the traditional Howey test, 147 and cannot be
143. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of amendments to the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure on court's intervention in the claims trading context).
144. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
145. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (analyzing the process of defining a security
under the Reves criteria).
146. See idL (discussing the analysis of claims trading under the Reves standard).
147. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria embodying the
Howey analysis).
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deemed a security on any other point.'" Given all the above, a
fortiori, the federal securities laws do not apply when that claim,
a non-security, is bought or sold in a bankruptcy proceeding.
This is not a poor result, for the protections already in existence
under the Bankruptcy Code make borrowing from the federal
securities laws unnecessary here. The Code's provisions mandate
and enforce full disclosure relevant to the claims trading process,
prohibit abuse of insider or superior information, and otherwise
ensure fair treatment for all parties. In short, the functional
equivalents of the Code achieve the same ends as the federal
securities laws, making any proposed application of the latter to
claims trading superfluous.
Under the presently controlling laws of both the bankruptcy and
the securities acts, it would be wrong to attempt to regulate the
trading of claims in bankruptcy by means of applying the existing
federal securities laws. If such regulation is to come to pass, it
should be created anew. Elements of both statutory bodies can be
meshed to create a cohesive and workable codification. But the
point remains that the process must start fresh.
In conclusion, the imposition of such an enforcement scheme
must be authorized by the Congress, and not be a creation of the
courts, especially given the recent withdrawal by the judiciary from
the claims trading process. One can only hope that the inevitable
bankruptcy reforms will competently address this issue in the near
future. Until that date, however, the separation of the federal
securities laws and the trading of claims in bankruptcy must be
maintained.
139
148. See supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text (discussing the classification of claims
trading under criteria other than Howey and Reves).

